In this paper we introduce credit constraints as in Manova (2013) in a framework of monopolistically competitive rms with endogenous markups, as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Before producing, rms need to invest in tangible xed assets to be used as collateral in order to obtain credit. In addition to productivity, rms are also heterogeneous in their nancial capability, so that a higher nancial expertise would involve advantages in the negotiation of redeployable assets, which the literature recognizes as crucial in decreasing the cost of collateral. By introducing heterogeneity in nancial capability, our theoretical model predicts that, conditional on productivity, a higher nancial capability is associated to higher markups. This allows us to study the implications of changes in collateral requirements faced by rms in their external borrowing. Specically, the model predicts that a tightening of collateral requirements produces two eects on markups: a market cleansing effect, through which a more competitive environment leads to lower markups, and a relative advantage of rms with higher nancial capability, leading to relatively higher markups. The theoretical results are tested empirically capitalizing on a representative sample of manufacturing rms covering a subset of European countries during the nancial crisis.
1 Introduction [To be added...] 2 Theoretical Model
Demand Side
We consider an economy with L consumers, each supplying one unit of labour. Consumers can allocate their income over two goods: a homogeneous good, supplied by perfectly competitive rms, and a dierentiated good. The market for the latter is characterized by monopolistic competition, with consumers exhibiting love for variety and horizontal product dierentiation. Preferences are quasi-linear as, e.g., in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) :
where the set Ω contains a continuum of dierentiated varieties, each of which is indexed by i. q 0 represents the demand for the homogeneous good, taken as numeraire, while q c i corresponds to the individual consumption of variety i of the dierentiated good. α and η are utility function parameters indexing the substitution pattern between the homogeneous and the dierentiated good; γ represents the degree of dierentiation of varieties i ∈ Ω instead. By assuming that the demand for the homogenous good is positive, i.e. q 0 > 0, and solving the utility maximization problem of the individual consumer, it is possible to derive the inverse demand for each variety:
By inverting (2) we obtain the individual demand for variety i in the set of consumed varieties Ω * , where the latter is a subset of Ω and retrieve the following linear market demand system:
, ∀i ∈ Ω *
N represents the number of consumed varieties, which also corresponds to the number of rms in the market since each rm is a monopolist in the production of its own variety; p = 1 N i∈ Ω * p i di is the average price charged by rms in the dierentiated sector. We can assume that the consumption of each variety is positive, i.e. q c i > 0, in order to obtain an expression for the maximum price that a consumer is willing to pay. Setting q i = 0 in the demand for variety i yields the following:
Therefore, prices for varieties of the dierentiated good must be such that p i ≤ p max , ∀i ∈ Ω * , which implies that Ω * is the largest subset of Ω that satises the price condition above.
Technology
Firms use one factor of production, labour, inelastically supplied in a competitive market. The production of the homogeneous good requires one unit of labour, which implies a wage equal to one. Both the dierentiated and the homogeneous good are produced under constant returns to scale, but the entry in the former industry involves a sunk cost f E , representing startup investments which constitute the initial endowment of each rm Firms are heterogeneous in productivity, having a rm-specic marginal cost of production c ∈ [0, c M ] randomly drawn from a given distribution right after entry. Based on observation of their marginal production costs, rms then decide whether to stay in the market and produce a quantity q(c) at a total production costs cq(c), or exit.
Financing of rms and collateral
In our framework rms need to borrow money from banks in order to nance a share of their production costs cq(c). Banks, which operate in a perfectly competitive banking sector, dene contract details for loans and make a take-it or leave-it oer to rms, including the collateral needed against the loan. Tangible xed assets are used as collateral. 1 In order to obtain credit and start producing, rms thus use (part of) their xed entry cost f E to invest into tangible assets that they can then pledge as collateral to banks. 2 In line with recent empirical evidence emerging from the nance literature (Campello and Giambona, 2012)) rms can invest their initial xed entry cost between two type of tangible assets: redeployable assets (R) constituted by land, plants and buildings; and non-redeployable assets (N), i.e. machinery and equipment. Redeployable assets are easier to resell on organized markets, and thus, being more liquid, can facilitate rms' 1 The use of tangibles as collateral for loans is a standard practice for rms asking for loans and a common feature of the nance literature, as discussed among others by Graham (1998 ), Vig (2013 ) or Brumm et al. (2015 .
2 Manova (2013) assumes that xed entry cost already constitute part of the collateral that rms can use, although she does not exclude that rms might invest in tangible assets to increase their capacity for raising outside nance. borrowing; non-redeployable assets, being more rm-specic and with a value that deteriorates over time (because of technological obsolescence) are less easy to be employed as a guarantee for loans compared to the formers.
Larger rms, having to nance a larger total production cost, will require a larger volume of credit and thus would need more collateral, which is an empirical regularity detected in the data (Rampini and Viswanathan, 2013) . As tangible assets are used as collateral, the latter also implies that larger rms will have more tangible asset, a well known stylized fact.
Hence, it is convenient to model the rm investment in tangible asset as the optimal allocation between redeployable and non-redeployable assets, given the 'endowment' of initial xed entry costs the rm is ready to pay, expressed in terms of the amount of tangible asset per unit of output. Each rm thus faces the following maximization problem:
subject to the constraint:
The term i(R, N ) represent the amount of tangible asset per unit of output that the rm obtains when allocating its endowment f E in redeployable and non-redeployable assets, given the price of the same assets, with α and (1−α) representing the marginal returns of the investment into assets of type R and N , respectively. While non-redeployable assets N are supplied in a perfectly competitive market at a price p N = 1, we assume that the price of redeployable assets R varies across rms, being the result of a bargaining process between the supplier of the same asset and the rm.
The price of redeployable assets depends in particular on the nancial capability of rms, which is a rm-specic parameter τ ∈ [0, 1] randomly drawn right after the entry of the rm. 3 Specically, the price of redeployable assets R is 1 − (τ ), with (τ ) ≥ 0 and itself increasing in τ . The intuition is that rms with better nancial expertise can fetch a lower price on the market for their redeployable assets. This is in line with evidence provided by Guner et al. (2008) , showing how the nancial expertise of directors plays a positive role in nance and investment policies adopted by the rm. 4 From the maximization of the investment function we obtain the following optimal amounts of R and N that a rm will buy:
Note that, while the optimal N is the same for all rms, the amount of redeployable assets increases with the nancial ability of rms. Hence, a greater nancial expertise translates in a more ecient use of the initial endowment. By plugging R * and N * in (4), we obtain the optimal amount of tangible assets per unit of output i * (τ ) that a rm of type τ can obtain:
in which i * (τ ) is strictly increasing in the nancial capability of the rm. Equation 5 also allows us to dene the nancial capability cuto, i.e. the minimum amount of nancial capability that rms need having to stay in the market. This corresponds to τ such that ( τ ) = 0, i.e. a rm characterized by the cuto nancial capability would not obtain any type of advantage in the price of redeployable assets. As a consequence, the τ -cuto rm will obtain an amount of tangible asset per unit of output equal to:
which represents the lower bound in the amount of tangible assets per unit of output that surviving rms are able to obtain on the market.
The implications of heterogeneity in nancial capability can be seen considering the case of all rms having the same nancial expertiseτ. As rms in the industry have the same xed entry cost f E , in our setting they will end up with the same amount of tangible asset per unit of output i(τ ). In this case, the total amount of tangible assets available to any rmĪ(c) = i(τ )q(c) will just be a function of the rm's size, i.e. ultimately of its marginal costs. In other words, even introducing a nancial sector in our framework, without heterogeneity in nancial capability productivity will remain the only endogenous variable needed to characterize the entire equilibrium of the industry, as a given marginal cost c would determine the rm's size q(c) and hence the volume of the loan as a share of production costs cq(c), as well as the amount of tangible assets I(c) and hence the availability of collateral. Introducing heterogeneity also on nancial capability τ , on top of productivity, allows instead to derive non-trivial implications for rms' behavior, especially when studying the implications of nancial shocks.
Coming to the modeling of the banking sector, banks do not know the actual nancial capability of rms, but can observe τ and the resulting amount of tangible xed assets of the lowest nancially capable (cuto) rm, which is given by iq(c). 5 Hence, they would supply loans to all rms that are nancially capable enough to stay in the market after the draw of their τ , i.e. those rms such that τ ≥ τ .
Following Egger and Seidel (2012) and Manova (2013) , rms need to externally fund a share σ of their total production costs cq(c) and have to repay R(c) to banks. Repayment occurs with exogenous probability λ, which is determined by the strength of nancial institutions, while with probability (1 − λ) the nancial contract is not enforced, the rm defaults, and the creditor seizes the collateral. In particular, a share β of all tangible xed assets is taken as collateral by the lender and collected if the rm is not able to repay the debt. The parameter β ∈ [0, 1] is sector-specic and decided by banks according to their nancing needs, as in Manova (2013) and Peters and Schnitzer (2015) .
Combining the two sources of rm heterogeneity in marginal costs and nancial capability (c, τ ) we can write the participation constraint of a bank as follows:
As we can easily see, no interest rate is charged by banks because of perfect competition in the banking sector. For the same reason, the participation constraint holds with equality for all banks. Hence, it is possible to derive an expression for the repayment function:
Although a nancial capability larger than τ is required in order to obtain a loan, such characteristic is not sucient. In fact, rms must also satisfy the following liquidity constraint:
A rm for which the above inequality does not hold would not be able to obtain the loan because of its inability to reimburse the debt to the borrower. This rm would exit the market right after the entry, i.e. after the random draw of its τ and marginal cost of production c.
Prot maximization
Each rm in the dierentiated sector maximizes the following prot function
under three constraints: the participation constraint (7), the liquidity constraint (9) and the demand for the supplied variety (3). The term β(i(τ ) − i)q(c, τ ) represents the cost advantage obtained by a rm with nancial capability equal to τ on the cost of collateral. Such term is the dierence between the actual investment in tangible xed assets made by a rm and the required investment to be used as collateral. This term enters the prot function directly as it represents a decrease in the debt burden proportional to the nancial expertise of the rm. By plugging (8) in the prot function we obtain a much simpler form for rm's prots:
Solving the prot maximization problem and using the demand constraint to derive ∂p
By rearranging the terms in the above equation, we nally obtain an expression for the supply of each rm:
We can now use the liquidity constraint in order to derive the marginal cost cuto c D .
Knowing that rms that would not be able to repay the debt will directly exit the market, the liquidity constraint (9) must hold with equality for the cuto rm. Moreover, since the cuto rm corresponds to that rm that sets p i = p max , we can rewrite (9) as follows:
Rearranging the terms in the equation above yields a simple expression for the p max in function of the cost cuto c D :
is a constant. Note that, since i(τ ) is increasing in τ , the maximum price charged by a rm corresponds to the price made by the least nancially capable rm. For this reason, in correspondence of the p max we have that i(τ ) = i( τ ).
Equilibrium
At the equilibrium, the demand for each variety equals the supply:
Note that the rst two terms on the left hand side are equal to the p max previously derived; hence, by substituting it with its expression in (12) and rearranging we obtain the equilibrium price charged by a rm characterized by a certain pair (c, τ ):
Furthermore, we can derive an expression for the equilibrium markup of a (c, τ )-rm by subtracting the marginal cost from the equilibrium price. Since the cost function has the following form:
By looking at expression (14), it is easy to note that, as in the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model, the equilibrium markup charged by a (c, τ )-rm is increasing in the production cost cuto c D and decreasing in the rm-specic marginal cost of production c. Hence, the less a rm is productive, the lower would be its markup (holding constant the eects on the equilibrium cost cut-o c D of the industry, herein discussed). Interestingly, the nancial capability of rms also plays a role in this framework. We formalize this result in the following Proposition I. The equilibrium markup µ(c, τ ) of a rm characterized by a pair (c, τ ) is an increasing function of the nancial capability of the rm, τ .
Considering that the function i(τ ) is increasing in τ , the above result is straightforward. The intuition is that a higher nancial expertise would not only result in larger advantages in capital accumulation and in contracting with banks, but also in a markup premium. Dierently from Manova (2013) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), we thus have that productivity is not the only rm characteristic aecting the equilibrium outcomes of the economy.
Finally, it is possible to derive an expression for a rm's prots in equilibrium:
Parameterization
To fully characterize the industry equilibrium, we have to solve for the value of the cost cut-o c D , taking into account both sources of heterogeneity (c, τ ). 6 As in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) , we assume that the marginal cost of production c follows an Inverse Pareto distribution with a shape parameter k ≥ 1 over the support [0, c M ]. Additionally, we assume that the nancial capability τ follows a Uniform distribution in the interval [0,1]. As already stated, the two probability distributions are independent. The cumulative density functions of c and τ can then be written as:
respectively. To solve for the equilibrium we also need to specify the functional form of (τ ), i.e. the price advantage enjoyed by the τ rm in the purchase of the redeployable asset. We assume that (τ ) = τ − a, with a ∈ [0, 1) being a constant. It is easy to note that (τ ) increases in τ and the function equals 0 in correspondence of a, therefore implying that the nancial capability cuto is τ = a.
By applying the free-entry equilibrium condition, according to which rms would be willing to enter the market until expected prots are equal to the xed cost of entry f E , we have:
Since dG(c) = g(c)dc and dF (τ ) = f (τ )dτ , we can solve the integral in the free entry condition as follows:
For simplicity, we name the rst, the second and the third term multiplying the powers of c in square brackets of the above equation as A, B and C, as these are all comprised of exogenous parameters. Therefore, the free entry condition can be rewritten as follows:
By rearranging the terms in (17) we obtain an expression for the production cost cuto c D :
As we can see by looking at expression (18), it is not possible to nd an explicit solution for c D . However, as shown in Appendix A, one can prove that a positive solution always exists, and is unique under the parameter restrictions of the model.
Shock to collateral requirements
Assume now that an exogeneous shock to the economy leads banks to pledge for a larger share of collateral, namely, β increases. We are interested in analysing the eect of such shock on markups charged by rms in the dierentiated sector.
Taking the rst derivative of µ(c, τ ) with respect to β yields:
We separately analyze the sign of the three terms in square brackets on the left-hand side of (19). First, by applying Dini's Implicit Function Theorem, according to which
Hy(x,h(x)) , we have that:
The sign of the derivative of c D w.r. to β is negative since, as shown in Appendix B, both the derivatives of π e in the above formula are positive. The intuition is that when banks pledge for more collateral, some rms would not be able to satisfy the liquidity constraint since the minimum required amount of tangible xed assets becomes larger. Hence, the least ecient rms in the market would not obtain the loan from banks and exit, generating a fall in the production cost cuto c D . As far as the second and the third term in (19) are concerned, their derivative is equal
λ . It then follows that for the cuto rm τ = α, the term is negative. Therefore, this negative eect adds to the negative eect of the change in β on c D described above. As the nancial capability τ of the rm increases, the term becomes smaller and eventually the sign of the derivative becomes positive.
We can formalize this result in the following Proposition II. The equilibrium markup µ(c, τ ) of a rm characterized by a pair (c, τ ) decreases with a shock to collateral requirements by banks, β. The negative eect is however mitigated for more nancially healthy rms: rms with a relatively high τ will experience a relatively smaller decrease in µ(c, τ ).
As a larger β can be associated to tighter credit constraints for rms, the model predicts that a negative shock to credit markets leads to the exit of least productive rms and to a general decrease in the level of markups. However, those rms that have been able to obtain a relatively lower cost in the generation of their tangible xed assets, due to their high nancial expertise, would experience a relatively milder shock.
Hence, dierently from a model in which marginal costs/productivity are the only source of rm heterogeneity, and thus a tightening in credit constraints would only aect the cost cuto c D equally aecting all rms in the market, the introduction of dierent rm-level nancial capabilities in our framework allows for an heterogeneous response of rms to a symmetric nancial shock.
3 Data and markups estimation 3.1 Firm-level data Our rm-level data derive from the rst survey on European Firms in a Global Economy (Ege), a research project funded by the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007 (FP7/ -2013 . The project aims at analyzing the competitive performance of European rms in a comparative perspective. This dataset is the rst harmonized crosscountry dataset containing quantitative as well as qualitative information on around 150 items for a representative sample of some 15,000 manufacturing rms in the following countries: Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. These items cover international strategies, R&D, innovation, employment, nancing and organizational activities of rms, before and after the nancial crisis.
The survey was carried out between January and April 2010. Managers were asked to report information on the dierent questions for the period 2008-09, with specic questions requesting information on the reaction of rms to the crisis in 2009/10, while other questions tracked the persistency of some variables (e.g. exports or innovation activities) in the years before 2008. The questionnaire has been administered via either CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interview) or CAWI (Computer Assisted Web Interview) procedures. The complete questionnaire is available on the Ege web page, www.ege.org. A discussion of the dataset as well as its validation is available in Altomonte et al (2012) An interesting characteristic of the Ege dataset is that, on top of the unique and comparable cross-country rm-level information contained in the survey, data can be matched with balance sheet gures. More precisely, we have been able to integrate Ege data with balance-sheet information drawn from the Amadeus database managed by Bureau van Dijck, retrieving twelve years of usable balance-sheet information for each surveyed rm, from 2001 to 2013. This data in particular enable the calculation of rm-specic measures of productivity and markups over time.
The Ege dataset includes about 3,000 rms operating in Germany, France, Italy and Spain, some 2,200 rms in the United Kingdom, and about 500 rms for Austria and Hungary, as reported in Table 1 below. The sampling design follows a stratication by industry, region and rm size structure. Firms with less than 10 employees have been excluded from the survey, that instead presents an oversampling of larger rms with more than 250 employees to allow for adequate statistical inference for this size class. Detailed information on the distribution of rms by country/size class and industry can be retrieved on the Ege website (http://www.bruegel.org/datasets/egedataset). 7
Financial capability and descriptive statistics
We exploit two questions available in the Ege sample as proxies of the rm-specicnancial capability. A rst question asks whether the rm uses derivatives for its nancial management strategy "During the last year did your rm use any kind of derivatives products (e.g. forward operations, futures, swaps) for external nancing needs or treasury management or foreign exchange risk protection? ". Around 46% of rms answer this question, and of those, around 10% report a positive answer. 8 A second question in the survey asks the rm's number of banks used. The question is answered by almost the entire sample and shows an average of three banks of two banks per rm (two for the median rm). We use these two variables variously combined as proxies of a rm's nancial capability. The intuition is pretty straightforward: if in the rm there are people able to manage derivative products for nancial hedging, this will imply a particularly high level of nancial capability of the rm. The same intuition works for the number of banks: the higher the number of banks with which the rm interacts and has relations, the more sophisticated we expect the nancial management strategy of the rm.
From the Amadeus dataset linked with Ege we derive instead information on Tangible Fixed Assets, Sales as a proxy of output and the number of employees. We report in Table 2 their descriptive statistics for the year 2008, i.e. the year referred to in the questions related to nancial capability. Table 2 reports also the descriptive statistics of the variables used as additional controls in the empirical analysis. The variable 'Adequate Production Scale' is a dummy indicating if, compared to competitors, the rm's scale of production is perceived as adequate: we use the latter to capture in the cross-sectional dimension a potential heterogeneity of rms that are considering to upgrading their production scale through future investments. The dummy 'Exporter' indicates if the rm has exported any of its product in the year 2008, or has exported "always" or "sometimes" its products before 2008. The variable 'Product Innovation' shows if the rm carried out any product innovation in the years [2007] [2008] [2009] . Similarly the dummy 'Quality Certication' assumes value one if the rm has gone through any form of quality certication (e.g. ISO9000) during 2008. Finally, 'Manager Rewarded' indicates if executives/managers are rewarded with variable benets based on their performance (including nancial and non-nancial benets).
Finally, we also have information on whether rms have requested in the considered period a loan from a bank, as our theoretical model works through this channel. Not surprisingly, this condition is veried for 14,139 rms in our data (i.e. 96% of the sample).
Markup and Productivity Estimation
In order to estimate markups and productivity, we follow De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), which introduced a method to estimate markups by employing expenditure on inputs and elasticity of output to the use of inputs in production. This innovative algorithm for markup computation has a relevant advantage over other methods reported in the literature: it yields rm-specic and time-varying mark-ups, which enables the use of these estimates in panel data analysis.
The production function for rm i in logs has the form: 20) where y it , l it and k it represent the log of output, labour and capital, respectively, ω it stands for the technological shock, i.e. productivity, and it is an error term. De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) estimate the production function coecients by using the algorithm developed by Ackerberg, Caves and Fraser (2006, ACF henceforth) , which is a two-step estimation procedure that allows to obtain consistent and unbiased estimates of β l and β k . In each period rms minimize their costs, i.e. they solve the following problem:
where λ it is the Lagrange multiplier and w it and s it correspond to the wage and the price of capital, respectively. The rst-order condition for the labour input can be written as
Rearranging terms and multiplying both sides by L it Y it we obtain:
Note that ∂Y it (·) ∂L it is the output elasticity of labor, which corresponds to β l under the assumption of Cobb-Douglas technology in production. Since λ it can be interpreted as the marginal cost of production c it , if we consider the denition of markup as the ratio between price and marginal cost and multiply both sides by P it , we have that:
where the term w it L it P it Y it corresponds to the share of expenditure in labour of rm i in period t, denoted with α L it . Consequently, De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) can write a time-varying rm-specic markup as follows:
An advantage of this method is that in order to obtain markup estimates we only need information about the share of expenditure in inputs, easily retrievable from balance sheets of companies, and the output elasticity of the labour input. The latter is obtained from the production function estimation, for which we mainly rely on Wooldridge (2009), which proposes the use of a GMM framework in order to obtain ecient estimates for β l and β k . For what concerns total factor productivity estimates (TFP, henceforth), they are obtained from the same estimation process.
As a robustness check, we have also estimated production function coecients à la ACF (2009) as in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), and then used the retrieved coefcients to construct alternative measures of markups and TFPs. Table 3 below reports median values and standard deviations of markups computed in our sample by using the two procedures. 
Empirical results
Our purpose is to analyze the relationship between markups and nancial capability of rms and the eect of a credit crunch on markups in the economy as described in our theoretical model. Therefore, the empirical analysis is focused on the test of Propositions 1 and 2.
Test of Proposition I
The model predicts that, conditional on rm-level productivity, a higher nancial capability τ is associated to higher markups. The channel of this eect takes place through the initial investment in tangible xed assets needed by the rm in order to generate the collateral necessary for obtaining the bank loan. In our model, nancially more capable rms are in fact able to generate redeployable assets (then primarily used as collateral) at cheaper costs, a gain then reected in their markups. In this section we empirically test for this channel. As discussed in the theoretical framework, our four main variables of interest are markups, productivity, nancial capability and rms' investments in tangible xed assets per unit of output. Recalling equation (14), we expect a positive correlation between markups and rm-specic productivity, as well as between markups and nancial capability. In particular, nancial capability τ is the our novel key variable inuencing positively the investment allocation of each rm. We test a preliminary correlation between these four variables in the cross-section of 2008 through the following regression:
where µ i is the rm-specic markup; T F P is the rm-specic productivity; F H and ln(Banks) are the variables proxying the rm-specic level of nancial capability, respectively in terms of an active nancial hedging strategy and as well as considering the (log) number of banks that the rm deals with; i i is the variable indicating the rm-specic tangible xed assets per unit of output; Z is a matrix of rm, country-industry eects discussed below; is the error term. The regression is run conditional on the fact that a rm has requested a bank loan in the considered period, a condition however satised by 96% of rms in our sample, as already discussed. Table 4 presents the results of the cross-section, with markups and productivity both estimated with the Wooldridge's method. 9 As expected, column (1) conrms that markups are positively correlated with productivity and that, conditional on it, nancially capable rms also display higher markups (for both proxies of nancial capability), as predicted by the theoretical framework. The results hold also controlling for rm's size, 10 as well as the (logarithm of) a rm's age. We also include a full set of country*industry xed eects to capture all possible spurious compositional eects beyond variation at the rm level. 11 In column (2) we repeat the exercise taking into account the additional rm level characteristics previously discussed: the rm reporting an adequate production scale, the export and innovation activities, the presence of quality certication as well as the strategy of remuneration of managers. Results are robust for our variables of interest.
In column (3) we add to the previous specication the (log of) tangible xed assets per unit of output (sales). If our theoretical model is correct, nancial capability should positively inuence the cost of generating tangible assets used as collateral, and thus tangible xed assets per unit of output should be positively and signicantly related to rm-level markups. In turn, nancial capability should be mediated by the latter variable in term of its eect on mark-ups. This channel seems to be conrmed by our results. In fact, we can observe that when tangible assets are included in the estimation the coecients associated to our proxies of nancial capability decrease and lose some significance, while tangible assets per unit of out are positively and signicantly associated to markups, always including the full set of country*industry and rm-level controls. The latter indicates on the one hand that nancial capability and tangible assets are indeed related and inuence markups, as postulated in our model; on the other hand, it is clear that there is a problem of endogeneity which we have to address. 12 For this, we go back to our theoretical model.
In section 2.3 we argued that the nancial capability of manager(s) is associated with a higher eciency (lower costs) in investing in tangible xed assets before starting to produce, i.e. before asking loans to banks. This extra cost advantage of rms characterized by a high nancial capability translates into higher level of markups during the production phase. The theoretical model thus suggests that nancial capability could be used as an instrument for the unit investment in tangible xed assets in the markup es-timation. The IV estimates are reported in column (4) of Table 4 , where our two proxies of nancial capability (Financial hedge and number of banks) are used as instruments for the tangible xed assets per unit of output, which turns out to be positively and signicantly associated to rm-level markups, always conditional on productivity and the usual set of rm-level as well as country*industry controls. The rst-stage of the IV estimation (reported on the bottom of Table 4 for the two variables of interest) conrms the power of our instruments (the F-statistic is above the critical threshold of 10), while the Hansen-J statistic conrms the validity of our instruments.
Overall, these results seem to provide robust evidence that a rm's nancial capability is associated to higher level of markups via the impact that the former characteristic has on the ability of the rm to eciently generate tangible xed assets, thus conrming our Proposition I.
Test of Proposition II
In order to test Proposition II we exploit the fact that, during the crisis years of 2008/09 the collateral requirements of banks have increased signicantly. We retrieve this information from the ECB Bank Lending Survey (BLS). The survey, started in 2005, contains questions regarding the development of supply and demand of loans during the past quarter and the expected evolution during the next quarter. In particular, some questions of the BLS indicate if, in a specic quarter, collateral requirements of banks have tightened, eased or showed no changes. The information is reported as the share of respondents on a -100/+100 percentage scale for a given country in a given year. We have averaged the quarterly data in order to obtain a year-country variation for this variable, labeled 'Collateral requirement'.
Specically, in the years 2008 and 2009, collateral requirements have tightened three fold, from a median value of .075 over the entire sample period to .21 for the two considered year. We have thus created a 'Crisis' dummy, taking value 1 for the years 2008-09 and 0 otherwise. We have hence tested Proposition II through the following specication
To achieve a parsimonious specication for our proxies of nancial capability, we have combined them into one dummy variable, taking value of 1 if a rm both uses nancial hedging strategies and has working relations with more than one bank (i.e. above the median of the variable), and zero otherwise. We have interacted this rm-level variable with the crisis dummy, in order to test, as postulated by Proposition II, nancially capable rms suer relatively less from a tightening of collateral requirements. As collateral requirements display some heterogeneity across countries and time in our sample, we have also interacted the latter variable with our main interaction variable (the coecient γ 6 ), to check whether the overall average eect of the nancial capability at times of crisis depends also on the extent to which collateral requirements have varied across countries in those years. Table 5 reports our results, tested over dierent time spans. Column (1) and (2) center the eect around the years of the crisis, including either the subsequent or the following years (2006-2009 and 2007-2010, respectively) , while column (3) extends the analysis to the entire sample 2006-2013 for which data on collateral requirements are available. Results, robust across the various specications (as well to the ACF algorithm for markups and productivity, as reported in Appendix), conrm indeed that nancially capable rms have suered relatively less from a tightening of collateral requirements in terms of markups, as conrmed by the relevant interaction. Overall, the marginal eect of nancial capability is positive and signicant across specications, in line with Proposition II.
Conclusions
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